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ByJ. THOMAS PRUD'HOMME, JR.* & ELLEN S. COOPER**
IN ILLINOIS BRICK CO. V ILLINOIS,1 the Supreme Court erred
when it held that downstream purchasers are not entitled to recover
damages for injuries suffered as a result of a violation of federal anti-
trust law. 2 Ironically, Illinois Brick was based on the Court's earlier de-
cision in Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,3 where the
Court had correctly held that an antitrust defendant could not avoid
paying damages to a direct purchaser plaintiff because that plaintiff
might have passed along overcharges to non-party indirect
purchasers. 4
Before and after Illinois Brick, various states adopted laws provid-
ing that indirect purchasers may recover damages for antitrust viola-
tions. In rejecting a preemption challenge to several such laws, the
Supreme Court in California v. ARC America Corp.5 restored the proper
relationship between antitrust victim and antitrust violator and be-
tween state and federal antitrust law by holding that Illinois Brick did
not preempt state laws permitting downstream purchasers to recover.6
Implementation of state indirect purchaser laws in the almost
thirty years since Illinois Brick demonstrates the error of the Court's
analysis in that decision. Moreover, parallel enforcement of state laws
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This Article is based on testimony prepared for the Antitrust Modernization
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or any other antitrust enforcer.
1. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2. Id. at 745.
3. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
4. Id. at 494.
5. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
6. Id. at 105-06.
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on behalf of indirect purchasers and federal law on behalf of direct
purchasers has created far more complexity and costs for defendants
and courts than if Illinois Brick had been correctly decided in the first
instance.
Antitrust defendants obviously find these circumstances unsatisfy-
ing. Their Illinois Brick victory became pyrrhic after ARC America, and
the Class Action Fairness Act of 20057 ("CAFA") may have actually ex-
acerbated defendants' difficulties in some cases.8 Most antitrust de-
fense counsel have abandoned the effort simply to legislatively repeal
ARC America.9 Recognizing that an indirect purchaser right of action
has probably been permanently established, many antitrust defense
counsel now advocate federal indirect purchaser antitrust damages
legislation, but believe any legislative remedy should contain at least
four components: (1) federal law overruling both Illinois Brick and
Hanover Shoe, (2) federal preemption of state law (i.e., overruling ARC
America), (3) consolidation of all related actions in a single federal
forum, and (4) allocation of damages among all plaintiffs (requiring
defendants to pay, at most, treble damages). 1°
Like antitrust defense counsel, many antitrust plaintiffs' counsel
believe the current system is costly, inefficient, and unnecessarily com-
plex. However, plaintiffs' counsel typically differ with defense counsel
on the appropriate solution. While some plaintiffs' counsel would
agree that Illinois Brick ought to be legislatively repealed, they might
not agree that Hanover Shoe should also be completely overruled, espe-
cially when direct-purchaser plaintiffs choose not to litigate. Most
plaintiffs, and certainly all Attorneys General, strenuously oppose fed-
eral preemption. While some plaintiffs might disagree with the idea of
consolidating all related actions in a single federal forum, CAFA has
7. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
8. An effective strategy often employed by antitrust defendants prior to CAFA was to
stay indirect purchaser state court proceedings in deference to the direct purchaser federal
court proceedings. It appears that under CAFA, this may no longer be possible: state court
proceedings will ordinarily be removed to federal court, where the federal judge, who is
precluded by Hanover Shoe from allocating damages among direct and indirect purchasers
as a matter of federal law, will be required to allocate damages among direct and indirect
purchasers under the laws of many individual states, thus complicating and possibly delay-
ing the federal action. Id. § 5.
9. But see, e.g., State Indirect Purchaser Litigation and U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Hearing
Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (2005) (testimony of Margaret M. Zwisler).
10. See State Indirect Purchaser Actions in the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement System: Hearing
Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (2005) (written testimony of David B. Tulchin);
State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals for Reform: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n (2005) (prepared statement of Michael L. Denger) [hereinafter Denger].
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rendered this opposition largely moot. Finally, many plaintiffs would
argue that the antitrust penalties and treble damages provided under
current federal law are typically considered a cost of doing business
and do not provide sufficient deterrence.11 Accordingly, they would
oppose allocating a single pool of up to treble damages among all
plaintiffs.
Attempts to broker a compromise among these competing inter-
ests have so far failed. 12 Indeed, satisfying all parties may be impossi-
ble. Nonetheless, reasonable people on both sides of the issue are
hoping that the Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC" or
"Commission"), as an independent, congressionally-authorized advi-
sory body, is the right group at the right time to recommend a fair
and reasonable legislative solution to the Illinois Brick problem.' 3
Part I of this Article briefly outlines how downstream purchasers'
rights to recover antitrust damages have changed over time. In Part II
of this Article, the Authors write from the perspective of state antitrust
enforcers and argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick
to eliminate such a right of recovery is theoretically and demonstrably
wrong and should be legislatively overruled. Part III then identifies
some of the more contentious issues associated with such a legislative
repeal, the resolutions that have been advocated by various interest
groups, and our favored resolution of those issues.
11. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble"Damages Really Single Damages ? 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 115 (1993).
12. See Andrew I. Gavil, Federal Judicial Power and the Challenges of Multijurisdictional
Direct and Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 860, 878-79 (2001),
for a chronology of American Bar Association task forces which have attempted to address
the issue.
13. The Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC" or "Commission") was created
pursuant to the Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § I note). The Commission con-
sists of twelve members, four of whom were appointed by the President, four of whom were
appointed by the leadership of the Senate, and four of whom were appointed by the lead-
ership of the House of Representatives. Id. § 11054(a). The AMC is charged by statute:
(1) to examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust laws and to
identify and study related issues;
(2) to solicit views of all parties concerned with the operation of the antitrust
laws;
(3) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements with re-
spect to any issues so identified; and
(4) to prepare and submit to Congress and the President a report in accordance
with section 11058.
Id. § 11053. The report is to contain "a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions
of the Commission, together with recommendations for legislative or administrative action
the Commission considers to be appropriate." Id. § 11058.
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I. Historical Perspective
In 1968 the Supreme Court decided Hanover Shoe.14 Hanover
Shoe had brought a treble damages action against United Shoe, alleg-
ing that United Shoe had overcharged Hanover Shoe for certain
leased equipment.15 United Shoe countered that Hanover Shoe had
passed on any overcharges to its customers and, therefore, had not
suffered cognizable damages.1 6 The Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, holding that defendants could not use pass-on as a defense in
antitrust actions. The Court based its holding on the difficulty of cal-
culating the amount of overcharge passed on by direct and other in-
termediate purchasers to the ultimate consumer, 1 7 as well as the
deleterious effect a pass-on defense would have on deterring future
antitrust violation; since, the Court assumed, most overcharges are
passed on and downstream purchasers would be less likely to enforce
their antitrust rights, allowing defendants to use the pass-on defense
would result in defendants paying less than the statutorily prescribed
treble damages in many cases.18
Nine years later the Court decided Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.19
There, the Illinois Attorney General filed suit under section 4 of the
Clayton Act 20 on behalf of a number of state and local governmental
entities seeking to recover for overcharges imposed by manufacturers
of concrete blocks, which had been used in the construction of public
buildings.2 1 The governmental entities had not purchased the blocks
directly from the manufacturer. 22 Accordingly, Illinois Brick presented
the question of whether a plaintiff who had not purchased directly
from an antitrust violator could recover overcharges that had been
passed through to it.23
14. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
15. Id. at 483-84.
16. Id. at 487-88.
17. Id. at 492-93. Professor Hovenkamp has noted that had the Court at this point
recognized the fundamental difference in the nature and calculation of damages suffered
by direct/intermediate purchasers and ultimate consumers, the current state of the law
would be much more rational. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rules and Cost
Plus Sales, 103 I-IARv. L. REv., 1717, 1721-25 (1990) [hereinafter Cost Plus].
18. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
19. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
21. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27.
22. Id.
23. This has incorrectly been referred to as "offensive use" of pass-on (as distin-
guished from the defensive use of pass-on attempted by defendant in Hanover Shoe). Plain-
tiffs who do not purchase from an antitrust violator make no "use" of pass-on, offensive or
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The Court held that downstream purchasers are not entitled to
recover damages for injuries suffered as a result of a violation of fed-
eral antitrust law. 24 As the first step in reaching this conclusion, the
Court concluded that plaintiffs and defendants must be treated the
same for purposes of pass-on. 25 Accordingly, the Court believed it was
required either to overrule Hanover Shoe, decided a mere nine years
earlier, and allow both plaintiffs and defendants to argue about the
pass-on issue, or to preclude indirect purchasers from arguing that
overcharges had been passed on to them.26
Predictably, Justice White, the author of Hanover Shoe, adhered to
the reasoning of that case in denying indirect purchasers an antitrust
damages remedy.27 He reiterated the difficulty of calculating pass-on
damages28 and the detrimental effect that recognizing an indirect
purchaser damages remedy would have on private enforcement of the
antitrust laws.29 He also noted that permitting both direct and indirect
otherwise. They simply seek to recover damages that happen to have passed through an-
other actor.
24. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 728.
25. Id. Both the plaintiffs and defendant agreed that this was the appropriate frame-
work. Id at 729. The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that such symmetry was not
required. Id. Essentially every federal circuit court to have considered the issue following
Hanover Shoe had reached the same conclusion as the United States. See Illinois v. Ampress
Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977); In reW. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1973); West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971); Armco Steel Corp. v.
North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 210-11 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1967); S.C. Council of Milk Producers,
Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir. 1966); Midway Enter., Inc. v. Petroleum Mktg.
Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339, 1344-45 (D. Md. 1974); see also S. Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule
Indus. Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), slip. op. 74,484, at 94,152 (S.D. Fla. 1972); In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 55 F.R.D. 269, 276 (D.D.C. 1972); Iowa v. Union Asphalt &
Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 401-03 (S.D. Iowa 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir.
1969). In Mangano v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitay Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir.
1971) (per curiam), the Third Circuit upheld dismissal of an antitrust action based on plain-
tiffs' failure to answer interrogatories and, alternatively, plaintiffs' failure to "show that
these overcharges became components of the prices they paid." Id. at 1188. The Third
Circuit's decision upholding dismissal for downstream plaintiffs' failure to prove pass-on
implicitly recognizes plaintiffs' right to recover if they could prove pass-on. This is borne
out by subsequent district court opinions in the Third Circuit that did not cite Mangano
and did not limit antitrust recovery to "direct" purchasers. See Midway Enter. Inc., 375 F.
Supp. at 1344-45 (allowing damages for downstream purchasers); In re Sugar Antitrust
Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 350-55 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same).
26. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
27. Id. at 731-48.
28. Id. at 731-33, 737-45.
29. Id. at 733-35, 745-48.
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purchasers to recover antitrust damages created the possibility that an-
titrust defendants might have to pay multiple damages.30
The Illinois Brick decision was not well received by many groups,
but caused particular concern to the state Attorneys General. By nulli-
fying most consumer antitrust damages claims, the decision signifi-
cantly weakened the parens patriae authority of the Attorneys General,
which had just been recognized at the federal level in section 4C of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.31 Indeed,
the Illinois Brick decision was flatly inconsistent with the intent of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, at least according to one of the Act's
sponsors.32
Thus, the Illinois Brick decision hampered the ability of the Attor-
neys General to invoke federal antitrust law when carrying out their
core mission of protecting consumers and government agencies.
Moreover, in the name of administrative efficiency, the Illinois Brick
decision worked a significant injustice, denying recovery to down-
stream, or "indirect," purchasers despite the recognition that, in most
circumstances, overcharges are ultimately passed on to consumers. 33
To correct this injustice, the Attorneys General supported federal
legislation introduced on several occasions since Illinois Brick that
would have effectively overruled that decision.34 None of these efforts
was successful.
The Attorneys General also filed amicus briefs advocating judicial
limitations on the application of Illinois Brick. For example, states
sought to expand the recognized exception to the Illinois Brick bar for
30. Id. at 730-31.
31. See S. REP. No. 95-9345, at 16-17 (1978) (noting that the Illinois Brick decision "has
led to a virtual nullification of parens patriae).
32. "[I]f the intervening presence of . . . a middleman is to prevent recovery, the
[parens patriae amendments] will be utterly meaningless." 122 CONG. REc. 30,868,
30,878-79 (1976) (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino); see also Antitrust Enforcement Act of
1979, S. 300: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 60-77 (1979) (state-
ment of Chauncey H. Browning); Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 58
(1979) (statement of William J. Scott).
33. See Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 300 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 69-77 (1979); Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the
Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 276-77 (1979);
Cost Plus, supra note 17, at 1726-27 & n.46.
34. See, e.g., H.R. 1942, 95th Cong. (1978); S. 1874, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 9132,
95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 8516, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 8359, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R.
2004, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 2060, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 300, 96th Cong. (1979). See also
Stephen Calkins, Illinois Brick and Its Legislative Aftermath, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 967 (1978).
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"cost plus" contracts, when allocation of damages would be relatively
simple. This effort has also been largely unsuccessful.35
Immediately after Illinois Brick, many states also began to amend
state contracts by inserting clauses assigning direct purchasers' anti-
trust claims to state government purchasers.3 6 These contractual pro-
visions have proven of limited utility, however, in that they are
procedurally difficult to enforce and, more importantly, do not pro-
vide relief to non-government consumers.
As the states attempted to limit the inequity wrought by Illinois
Brick through federal legislation and litigation and through amend-
ment of state contracts, many also tried to obtain relief through state
law. This response to Illinois Brick entailed enacting state legislation
that expressly permits damage recovery by downstream purchasers
harmed by a violation of state antitrust law.37 Other states had preex-
isting antitrust statutes that have been judicially interpreted to permit
recovery of antitrust damages by downstream purchasers. 38 Still others
have consumer protection or other laws that have been judicially in-
terpreted to permit downstream purchasers to recover damages, in-
cluding damages for violations that are functionally equivalent to
antitrust violations.3 9 Finally, some state consumer protection and an-
titrust statutes permit equitable relief including disgorgement and/or
restitution, which have been interpreted to permit downstream pur-
chasers to recover for antitrust violations.40 All of these state laws have
been labeled, somewhat imprecisely, "Illinois Brick repealers."
35. See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 207 (1990).
36. See George J. Bentson, Indirect Purchasers' Standing to Claim Damages in Price Fixing
Antitrust Actions: A Benefit/Cost Analysis of Proposals to Change the Illinois Brick Rule, 55 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 213, 245 n.85 (1986).
37. One of the first states to adopt such legislation was California. The California
legislation provides in relevant part that an action under the California antitrust statute
'may be brought by any person who is injured in his or her business or property by reason
of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this chapter, regardless of whether such
injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant." CA.L. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16750(a) (West 1997). Examples of other states with state antitrust statutes expressly re-
jecting Illinois Brick include Illinois, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7-2 (West 2002), and
New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 340(6) (McKinney 1999).
38. See, e.g., Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 47 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002); Hyde v. Abbott Labs., 473 S.E.2d 680, 684 (1996).
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.211(2) (West 2002), as interpreted by Mack v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb, 673 So. 2d 100, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
93A § 1-11 (LexisNexis 2005), interpreted by Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 762
N.E.2d 303, 308 (Mass. 2002).
40. See, e.g., FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); Dare to Be
Great v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1972).
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As the Attorneys General labored in the wake of Illinois Brick to
use state law to obtain recoveries for injured consumers and state
agencies, supporters of the Illinois Brick bar sought to invalidate these
state laws, arguing that Illinois Brick required preemption of inconsis-
tent state law. The Supreme Court, in an opinion again written by
Justice White, unanimously rejected this argument in ARC America
Corp.41
There, the States of California, Minnesota, Alabama, and Arizona
filed suit on behalf of government agencies against price-fixing ce-
ment manufacturers. 42 Because the injured agencies had not pur-
chased the cement directly from the price fixers, the States based
their claims for damages on state antitrust statutes. 43 In response, a
class of direct purchaser plaintiffs argued that state laws permitting
indirect purchasers to recover antitrust damages are inconsistent with
the Clayton Act as interpreted in Illinois Brick and are therefore pre-
empted.44 The Supreme Court, however, noted the presumption
against preemption "in areas traditionally regulated by the States,"45
stating that "[g]iven the long history of state common-law and statu-
tory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices, it is
plain that this is an area traditionally regulated by the States." 46 In
fact, "Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not
displace, state antitrust remedies."47 Accordingly, the Court held the
Clayton Act does not preempt state indirect purchaser laws.
Thus, for the past few decades, downstream purchasers have se-
cured monetary recoveries for antitrust violations under state law.
With that history, we should ask whether the justifications expressed
in Illinois Brick for barring recoveries by such purchasers under federal
law withstand scrutiny.
41. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-06 (1989).
42. Id. at 97.
43. Id. at 98.
44. Id. at 99.
45. Id. at 101.
46. Id. (citations omitted). The Court observed:
At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act, 21 States had already adopted
their own antitrust laws .... Moreover, the Sherman Act itself . . . "does not
announce a new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles
of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal
Government."
Id. at n.4.
47. Id. at 102.
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II. Illinois Brick Has Not Aged Well
In Illinois Brick, the Court upended every prior federal court of
appeals decision 48 and denied a federal antitrust remedy to millions
of consumers. 49 The decision was inconsistent with the plain language
of the Clayton Act and with clear statements of congressional intent.
Moreover, the Court's reasoning does not withstand scrutiny, espe-
cially in light of subsequent enforcement of state statutes permitting
indirect purchaser antitrust plaintiffs to recover damages. Finally,
from the defense perspective, ARC America has rendered Illinois Brick
largely irrelevant, if not harmful.
A. Illinois Brick Was Wrongly Decided
1. The Result Is Inconsistent with the Plain Language of and
Congressional Intent Behind the Clayton Act
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any plaintiff who is
"injured in his business or property" through an antitrust violation
may recover damages.50 It does not discriminate between direct and
indirect purchasers.5 1
As noted by the dissent in Illinois Brick, if it is necessary to discrim-
inate between direct and indirect purchasers in interpreting section 4,
[t]he legislative history ... shows that [the treble damages provi-
sion] was conceived primarily as a remedy for "(t)he people of the
United States as individuals," especially for consumers .... These
actions were conceived primarily as "'open(ing) the door ofjustice
to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the
antitrust laws, and giv(ing) the injured party ample damages for
the wrong suffered."' 5 2
In addition,
The ... Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 was
expressly adopted to create "an effective mechanism to permit con-
sumers to recover damages for conduct which is prohibited by the
Sherman Act, by giving State attorneys general a cause of action (to
sue as parens patriae on behalf of the States' citizens) against anti-
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
49. Prior to Illinois Brick, "indirect" purchasers were plaintiffs in almost two-thirds of
all private federal antitrust actions and the only plaintiffs in twenty-five percent of these
cases. S. REP. No. 95-934, at 19-20 (1978).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
51. See Cost Plus, supra note 17, at 1718 "On its face, the indirect-purchaser rule ap-
pears inconsistent with section four of the Clayton Act .... The indirect-purchaser rule
potentially awards the direct purchaser more than three times the damages 'by him sus-
tained,' while indirect purchasers receive nothing." Id.
52. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 754-55 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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trust violators." . . . The Senate Report accompanying the new Act
expressly found that "(t)he economic burden of most antitrust vio-
lations is borne by the consumer in the form of higher prices for
goods and services .... 53
Representative Rodino, one of the Act's sponsors, stated "recov-
eries are authorized [under the Act] whether or not the consumers
purchased directly from the price fixer, or indirectly. ... 54
As the Illinois Brick dissent correctly noted, "It is difficult to see
how Congress could have expressed itself more clearly."55
2. The Three Pillars of the Court's Analysis Do Not Bear the
Weight of the Result
As noted above, the Court in Illinois Brick provided three reasons
for barring downstream recovery of antitrust damages: (1) the bar
avoids the risk that defendants might have to pay multiple damages;
(2) direct purchasers are the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust
laws; and (3) pass-on damages are difficult to calculate. 5 6
As to the possibility of duplicative damages, the Supreme Court
effectively abandoned this justification in its ARC America decision
when it upheld state antitrust laws that might require defendants to
pay damages under state law, regardless of whether they would also be
required to pay damages under federal antitrust law. 57 Moreover, this
justification has proven, in the almost thirty years since Illinois Brick, to
be entirely hypothetical. To the Authors' knowledge, there has not
been a single documented instance where a defendant has been sub-
ject to suit by direct and indirect purchasers and been required to pay
more than treble damages. As one commentator has noted, "The anti-
trust enforcement experience in the nearly three decades since the
Illinois Brick ruling suggests that the concerns about multiple liability
cited by the Illinois Brick majority might be overblown. 5 8
Likewise, the efficiency-of-enforcement rationale has not with-
stood the test of time. 59 Even assuming this rationale's validity when
53. Id. at 756 (citations omitted).
54. 122 CONG. REc. H10295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976) (Statement of Rep. Peter W.
Rodino).
55. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 758.
56. Id. at 730-33 (majority opinion).
57. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989).
58. Edward D. Cavanaugh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 Loy. CON-
SUMER L. REv. 1, 43-44 (2004) (noting that federal courts regularly exact large criminal
fines on top of civil treble damage awards).
59. See id. at 49 ("Indirect purchaser suits have led to a modest up-tick in
deterrence.").
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applied to private litigants, this justification is and always has been
inapplicable to state Attorneys General acting in their parens patriae
capacity on behalf of consumers. Under their respective state antitrust
laws, most Attorneys General have pre-litigation investigative author-
ity, usually including compulsory process for the production of docu-
ments and testimony. With this authority, the Attorneys General are at
least as capable as "direct" purchasers of ferreting out antitrust viola-
tions and enforcing the antitrust laws. 60
Finally, as to the difficulty of allocating damages among direct
and downstream purchasers, while problems undoubtedly still re-
main, they are more manageable today. Advances since 1977 in data
capture, storage, and manipulation, as well as in econometric model-
ing have made such allocation less problematic. 61 Moreover, when the
Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick in 1977, trial courts were limited
in their ability to evaluate and exclude possibly dubious expert testi-
mony. Since then, the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal
district courts are qualified to evaluate expert testimony and act as
gatekeepers for the admission of such testimony. 62 Even assuming that
insurmountable analytical difficulties for allocating damages re-
mained in particular cases, the federal courts are now equipped to
deal with them by simply excluding unreliable expert testimony.
B. State and Private Plaintiffs' Enforcement on Behalf of Indirect
Purchasers Shows the Efficacy of State Indirect Purchaser
Remedies and Highlights the Court's Error in illinois Brick
Some recent cases highlight the success of the Attorneys General,
and others, in obtaining recoveries under state law on behalf of in-
jured downstream purchasers. These cases provide ample testimony to
the effectiveness of the state-law remedy and call into question the
continued viability of the Court's reasoning in Illinois Brick.
60. See id. ("[C]onsumers, at least in actions brought by state governments, are getting
some compensation from antitrust violators."); Cost Plus, supra note 17, at 1729 (noting
that "private plaintiff lawsuits that follow separately initiated government price-fixing pros-
ecuions... account for well over one-third of private price-fixing filings ... [and] inde-
pendent antitrust practitioners are probably in the best position to 'detect' worthwhile
private cartel cases simply by keeping up with the literature on government investiga-
tions"). Moreover, direct purchasers often have little incentive to sue their suppliers for
antitrust violations. Litigation usually disrupts business operations and creates ill-will while
overcharges may be passed on to downstream purchasers.
61. For example, using available data, the states have submitted damages calculations
in a wide variety of pharmaceutical cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 1999).
62. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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For instance, in F-TC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.6 3 the Attorneys
General of thirty-three states conducted ajoint litigation with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC"). The states represented government
agencies and consumers, the majority of whom were "indirect" pur-
chasers of the anti-anxiety drugs lorazepam and clorazepate. The FTC
and states jointly settled with defendants for $100 million, to be dis-
tributed to downstream purchasing consumers and to government
agencies. Under this settlement, affected consumers who submitted
valid claims received compensation equal to 100% of the total value of
their purchases of the relevant drugs over the relevant time period. In
total, 203,471 consumer refund checks worth $42,937,014.80 were
mailed for an average check value of approximately $211, although
many individual consumer checks exceeded $1000.64
Separate classes of non-consumer, non-government "indirect"
purchasers ("third party payors") 65 and direct purchasers filed actions
in the District of Columbia District Court.66 The direct purchaser ac-
tion was settled for $35 million, while the third party payor down-
stream purchaser case settled for $25 million. 67 Some businesses
opted out of the third party payor downstream purchaser settlement,
and, recently, a jury awarded pre-trebled damages in excess of $12
million to four end-payor insurance companies.68 The cumulative
amount of these settlements and verdict (assuming it is trebled) is less
than treble the states' estimate of overcharge damages.69
Likewise, in In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation,70 the Attorneys
General of thirty states represented consumers and state agencies,
most of whom were downstream purchasers of the drug BuSpar. 71
63. 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
64. In addition, state agencies received $28,217,983 and over $2,880,000 was distrib-
uted cy pres under the express condition that the funds were to be used "in a manner
reasonably targeted to specifically benefit the health care needs of a substantial number of
persons injured by the increased prices of lorazepam and/or clorazepate." In re Lorazepam
& Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 381 (D.D.C. 2002).
65. The Attorneys General typically either lack legal authority to or, as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion tend not to, represent non-consumers, such as third party payor
insurance companies, parens patriae.
66. Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 373-74.
67. Id. at 392.
68. See Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., Civ. No. 01-2464 (TFH); Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Minn., Civ. No. 02-1299 (TFH) (Verdict Form, June 1, 2005).
69. Overcharge damages are to be distinguished from other types of damages arising
from an antitrust violation, such as direct purchasers' lost profits or competitors' lost sales/
profits.
70. 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
71. Id. at 365-66.
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Pursuant to their settlement with defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb, the
Attorneys General recovered $100 million for their consumers and
government agencies. Under this settlement, affected consumers who
submitted valid claims received compensation equal to more than
100% of the total value of their purchases of the relevant drugs over
the relevant time period. In total, over $37 million in refund checks
was distributed to consumers. 72 The minimum consumer check was
$75.00, the average consumer check was $646.97, and many checks
reached into the thousands of dollars. 73
The Buspirone litigation also involved a private class of non-con-
sumer downstream purchasers, as well as a direct purchaser class. All
of these actions were consolidated with the Attorney General action
for pretrial purposes, and the settlements in all of these actions were
contemporaneously negotiated.74 The non-consumer downstream
purchasers settled for $90 million, 75 while the direct purchasers set-
tled for approximately $220 million. 76 Some of the non-consumer
downstream purchasers opted out of that settlement and have since
settled separately for approximately $50 million.77 Finally, several
competitors sued Bristol-Myers Squibb directly, and received approxi-
mately $60 million. 78
Comparing the BuSpar settlement amounts to estimated damages
is difficult. The lawsuits involved two separate claimed violations, one
with relatively low potential damages but a high likelihood of success,
and another with very high potential for damages but a lower likeli-
hood of success. Although the settlements do not allocate damages
among the different claims, we roughly estimate that the aggregate
value of all settlements (excluding the competitor claims) is less than
single overcharge damages for the claim with the high damage poten-
tial, and approximately double the potential overcharge damages for
the claim with the low damage potential.
72. State agencies received over $65 million. Telephone Interview with Paul A. Blas-
kis, Paralegal, Office of the Ohio Attorney Gen. (Mar. 2, 2006).
73. Id.
74. Telephone Interview with Alan M. Barr, Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Md.
(Aug. 31, 2005).
75. Amended Settlement Agreement, In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1413
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003).
76. Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action and Hearing Regarding Settle-
ment, In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1413 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2003).
77. Email from William Shieber, Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Tex., to J. Thomas
Prud'homme, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., State of Tex. (June 3, 2005) (on file with
Authors).
78. Id.
Spring 2006] AMC SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Another example of the success of the Attorneys General in ob-
taining consumer recoveries is State of Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,79
in which the Attorneys General of all fifty-six states, territories, and
possessions represented consumers and state agencies, most of whom
were indirect purchasers of the drug Taxol.80 Pursuant to their settle-
ment with Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Attorneys General recovered $55
million in settlement of their consumers' and government agencies'
claims.81 Under this settlement, affected consumers who submitted
valid claims received compensation equal to 100% of their estimated
overcharges.8 2 A total of 12,723 checks were mailed out, worth
$7,242,114, for an average amount per check of $569.21.83 In addi-
tion, Bristol-Myers Squibb is currently supplying 13,000 vials of Taxol
without charge for distribution to indigent patients.8 4
Like the BuSpar case, the Taxol litigation also involved a private
class of third party payor downstream purchasers and a direct pur-
chaser class. The third party payor downstream purchasers settled for
$15,185,000; the direct purchasers settled for $65,815,000.85
In these cases, and many more, the Attorneys General and private
plaintiffs' counsel have effectively represented and obtained meaning-
ful recoveries on behalf of indirect purchasers, despite the concerns
expressed by the Court in Illinois Brick.
79. No. 02-civ-01080, slip op. (D.D.C. May 13, 2003).
80. Id. at 1.
81. Settlement Agreement Between Plaintiff States and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. Re-
garding Taxol, Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 02-cv-01080 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2003).
82. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff States' Motion for Final Approval of Settle-
ment, Distribution Plans and Class Certification at 18, Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 02-
cv-01080 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2003).
83. Plaintiff States' Report on Consumer Claims, State Agency and Attorneys Fees Dis-
tributions and Claims Administration Expenses at 2, Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 02-
cv-01080 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2005). State agencies received $37.5 million. Id. The balance of
the consumer portion of the settlement will be distributed cy pres to benefit cancer patients
and their families. Id. at 3.
84. Order and Judgment Granting Final Approval of Plaintiff States' Settlement and
Distribution Plans, Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 02-cv-01080 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2003).
85. Final Order and Judgment Approving Settlements Between Direct Purchaser Class
Plaintiffs and Defendants Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and American Bioscience, Inc., at
3, Oncology and Radiation Assoc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 02-cv-01080 (D.D.C. May 13,
2003).
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C. Use of State Indirect Purchaser Remedies Under ARC America
Renders Illinois Brick Largely Moot as an Effective Defense,
Regardless of Whether It Was Correctly Decided
As the immediately preceding discussion illustrates, the states
(and many plaintiffs' counsel) make every effort to coordinate and
streamline indirect purchaser actions. The vast majority of actions
brought by Attorneys General on behalf of downstream purchasers
are brought in a coordinated fashion, on behalf of consumers in more
than one state. Most of these cases are brought in federal court via a
single complaint, with multiple state-law supplemental claims. 86 Many
of these cases have been consolidated with class actions and in each
such case, the Attorneys General have successfully coordinated their
case prosecution with class counsel to avoid duplication and inconsis-
tent representation.8 7
Nevertheless, the dual remedy regime created by the interaction
of Illinois Brick, ARC America, and state indirect purchaser laws creates
at least potential, and often real substantive and procedural difficul-
ties for defendants. It is indeed ironic that having won a significant
victory in Illinois Brick, defendants' plight is now worse under ARC
America. Defendants now may have to litigate difficult pass-on issues,
possibly in multiple state courts.8 8 Furthermore, defendants not only
face the possibility of multiple damages, they face the possibility of
having such damages assessed in multiple state courts on behalf of
indirect purchasers, while being precluded from arguing pass-on in
federal court actions brought by direct purchasers. 89
86. See, e.g., FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Ohio v. Brisol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 02-civ-01080 (D.D.C.
2002); In re Clozapine Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Maryland v. Perrigo
Co., 1:04CV01398 (D.D.C. 2004); In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig., Master File
No. Civ. 02-2007 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., Master File No. 01-CV-1 2239-
WGY (D. Mass. 2004).
87. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D.
197 (D. Me. 2003).
88. See Cavil, supra note 12, at 876-77 (noting that "[flollowing the initiation of the
government's prosecution of Microsoft in May 1998, Microsoft faced sixty-four follow-on
federal antitrust actions, and 117 state court actions .. "); Cost Plus, supra note 17, at 1719
("state and federal antitrust systems render the rationales of Illinois Brick practically mean-
ingless, because 'duplicative' recovery will exist and pass-on will have to be established in
litigation . . ").
89. It bears repeating that while defendants face the theoretical possibility of multiple
damages, defense counsel have so far failed to document a single case where a defendant
has actually paid greater than treble damages when being sued by both direct and indirect
purchasers.
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III. So What Is the Answer?
The AMC should recommend to Congress both substantive and
procedural changes to address the problems created by Illinois Brick.
Substantively, it should recommend that Congress overrule Illinois
Brick and provide a federal remedy for downstream purchasers. At the
same time, the AMC should recommend that Congress retain a modi-
fied version of Hanover Shoe to prevent defendants from using pass-on
to absent plaintiffs as a defense to damages. As a final substantive mat-
ter, the AMC should recommend that Congress not preempt state
laws that currently provide for recovery by indirect purchasers.
Procedurally, much of Congress's work has already been done
with the adoption of CAFA. Nonetheless, the AMC should recom-
mend that Congress overrule the Supreme Court's Lexecon Inc. v. Mil-
berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach90 decision, thereby permitting
consolidation of multidistrict cases for all purposes, including trial.
Finally, the AMC should recommend the adoption of a three-phase
trial (liability, damages, and damage allocation) in antitrust cases in-
volving plaintiffs at multiple levels of distribution.
A. Substantive Recommendations
1. Overrule Illinois Brick
The Illinois Brick decision is inconsistent with the text of section 4
of the Clayton Act, which provides that any plaintiff who is "injured in
his business or property" through an antitrust violation may recover
damages. 9 1 It is also inconsistent with express congressional intent in
enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.92
The Illinois Brick decision is quite simply an expression of that Su-
preme Court majority's empirically unsupported theory of how best to
maximize deterrence and judicial economy, at the expense of the
clear text and legislative history of the Clayton Act, both of which fo-
cus on compensating antitrust victims. 93
90. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c); see supra Part II.A.1.
93. Although it has long been a rule in antitrust cases that damages may not be based
on mere speculation, a jury may make a "just and reasonable estimate." The rationale for
the more relaxed standard is that ascertainment of the precise damages is often difficult as
a result of the defendant's illegal conduct. Thus, plaintiffs should continue to benefit from
the leeway established in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946), and
other cases permitting reasonable inferences in establishing damages, and damages should
be awarded to the plaintiff actually "injured in his business or property" within the mean-
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As has been shown above, each of the three pillars of the Court's
Illinois Brick analysis is either incorrect or irrelevant in light of the con-
tinued viability of indirect purchaser remedies under state law.94
Moreover, as virtually every commentator on the subject has noted,
the dual federal/state enforcement system created by Illinois Brick and
ARC America is extremely inefficient and costly to defendants, courts,
and, in many cases, plaintiffs. 95 While CAFA may have ameliorated
some of the procedural difficulties created by the dual enforcement
system, 96 it does not address all of them and may actually have made
things more difficult for some defendants in some situations. 9 7
Something needs to be done. At the most basic level, Congress
has two choices: overrule Illinois Brick or overrule ARC America. In
other words, Congress can either provide a federal right of recovery to
indirect purchasers, or completely preclude indirect purchasers from
recovering under both federal and state law.
A number of factors favor the former course. First, and most im-
portantly, Illinois Brick was incorrectly decided. As noted above, the
Court created three justifications for its rule without any empirical
support whatsoever. Subsequent experience with state indirect pur-
chaser actions has not substantiated the concerns underlying the
Court's analysis.
Of equal importance, ARC America was correctly decided. Our
forefathers assumed that the states would take primary responsibility
for economic regulation and legislation relating to the welfare of their
citizens. 98 The states have a long history of enacting and enforcing
antitrust laws. Congress originally adopted the Sherman Act to supple-
ment twenty-one pre-existing state antitrust statutes. 99 Congress today
should be hesitant to preempt the states from carrying out these tradi-
tional activities, especially where, as here, there is no evidence to show
that the states are abusing their authority or having any adverse effect
on business and commerce. Indeed, any adverse effects created by the
inconsistency between federal and state law in the present context
were created by Illinois Brick.
ing of section 4 of the Clayton Act. See generally, Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal and Eco-
nomic Issues, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAw.
94. See supra Part II.A.1.
95. See supra Part II.C.
96. See infra Part III.B.1.
97. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
98. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 n.4 (1989).
99. See id.
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Finally, overruling Illinois Brick would not "open the floodgates"
by allowing even the most remote of indirect purchasers to recover.
Other doctrines of federal antitrust law, such as antitrust injury and
standing, prevent many injured plaintiffs from recovering damages.
Under these doctrines, unlike the near absolute rule of Illinois Brick,
courts are permitted to weigh such factors as the nature of the plain-
tiff's injury and the relationship between the specific injury and the
alleged antitrust violation.100 Thus, even in the absence of Illinois
Brick, courts would still retain the necessary power to reject claims that
are inherently speculative. Downstream purchasers with non-specula-
tive claims, however, could recover.
2. Retain Hanover Shoe as to Any Level of Distribution That Does
Not Sue
The Illinois Brick decision is probably best understood as an at-
tempt to comply with the old adage that "what's good for the [defen-
dant] goose is good for the [plaintiff] gander." This rule of symmetry
is not legally required, nor is it necessarily good law or policy.10 1 Ac-
cordingly, it does not necessarily follow that if Congress overrules Illi-
nois Brick it should also overrule Hanover Shoe in its entirety.
Of course, if Congress overrules Illinois Brick and adopts procedu-
ral reforms that result in the consolidation of most direct and indirect
purchaser lawsuits in federal court, the federal courts will necessarily
be involved in allocating damages among plaintiffs from various levels
of distribution that file suit. Under these circumstances, Hanover Shoe
is likely to be largely irrelevant, since the real fight between the de-
fendants and the plaintiffs will be over the total amount of damages;
defendants will likely not care how such damages, once awarded, are
ultimately divided among the plaintiffs.
However, Hanover Shoe's rule against defensive use of pass-on re-
mains relevant when not all classes of plaintiffs sue. Allowing antitrust
violators to argue pass-on where not all classes of plaintiff sue allows
the violators to keep all or part of their ill-gotten gains, thereby mini-
mizing deterrence. Full deterrence requires that Hanover Shoe be re-
tained for these situations.
Of course, it could be argued that the proposed rule would en-
courage potential plaintiffs to sit on their rights, waiting for a determi-
nation of liability before filing suit and demanding their fair share.
100. Compare Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), with Assoc. Gen. Contrac-
tors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
101. See, e.g., Cost Plus, supra note 17; Cavanaugh, supra note 58, at 43-44.
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Two examples come to mind. First, a potential plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs not represented by an existing class could wait out the judg-
ment before filing suit. However, as the Illinois Brick dissent correctly
points out, this is an unlikely scenario, given "[t]he extended nature
of antitrust actions ... combine [d] with the short four year statute of
limitations ... ,"02 Moreover, defendants do not actually pay greater
than treble damages when subjected to multiple layers of liability to-
day. Therefore, the extremely remote possibility of multiple damages
under this scenario does not warrant rejection of the proposal. Sec-
ond, a putative class member, say a large direct purchaser, such as a
health insurer in a drug case, might opt-out of a class settlement, hop-
ing to get a better deal for itself. Here, the statute of limitations would
not have run against the opt-out during the pendency of the action.
Thus, this scenario could occur relatively frequently. In this circum-
stance, a rule mandating, consistent with the minimum requirements
of due process, that such an opt-out quickly decide (e.g., within sixty
days) whether to file suit seems reasonable. Such a suit would have to
be filed in the court before which the consolidated related cases were
already pending.
3. No Preemption
The state Attorneys General unanimously oppose preemption of
state antitrust laws, including Illinois Brick repealers.10 Almost every
state has an antitrust law of general applicability; every state has some
type of antitrust law. 10 4 In fact, twenty one states had enacted antitrust
statutes before the Sherman Act was passed in 1890.105 While state
statutes differ, many are interpreted in conformity with federal anti-
trust law. The majority give some deference to federal court interpre-
tations of federal law. As chief law officers of their states, the Attorneys
General are the primary enforcers of their states' antitrust laws. The
Attorneys General also represent the consumers within their states,
either as parens patriae or as its functional equivalent under state
law. 10 6 The Attorneys General also may bring proprietary actions on
behalf of governmental entities to recover overcharges either in state
102. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 764 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Resolution, Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., Principles of State Antitrust Enforce-
ment, (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter NAAG Resolution].
104. On state antitrust enforcement authority, see generally State Antitrust Enforcement
Handbook, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAw [hereinafter Handbook]; Monograph No. 15, Anti-
trust Federalism: The Role of State Law, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAw.
105. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 n.4 (1989).
106. Handbook, supra note 104, at 18.
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or federal court.'0 7 Because approximately 75% of all purchases by
local governments and state agencies are made though "indirect" dis-
tribution channels,108 state Illinois Brick repealers can have a signifi-
cant impact on state coffers.
The Attorneys General have stated their belief that "the erosion
of state sovereignty is inimical to the basic principles of federalism
that inhere in our Constitution." 109 The Attorneys General, therefore,
oppose "federal preemption of any state antitrust statutes, including
indirect purchaser statutes, or other limitation of state antitrust au-
thority, as such preemption or limitation would impair enforcement
of the antitrust laws, harm consumers, and harm free competition."'110
History supports the position of the Attorneys General on pre-
emption. As a result of our system of federalism, the state "laborato-
ries of democracy" have in many instances ultimately influenced
debate on federal policy."1 The current debate over the status of "in-
direct" purchasers is but one example. Other current examples in-
clude the treatment of resale price maintenance and the balance
between economic efficiencies and consumer price effects in analyz-
ing mergers. 112 As one commentator concluded in an article on anti-
trust federalism:
Federalism allows for the experimentation, the successes, and the
failures needed to find the best approach for a given time and a
given market. It reminds legislators, courts and scholars that, on
many key issues, reasonable minds may differ and that, because so-
ciety has conflicting and overlapping desires, there may not be one
single answer. 1 13
In the present situation, states have developed a full panoply of
downstream purchaser remedies, all of which recognize the funda-
mental injustice of Illinois Brick. Some provide for single damages;1 1 4
others for treble damages." 5 Some incorporate Hanover Shoe",16
107. A state, as well as its political subdivisions, is a "person" entitled to secure relief
under the federal antitrust laws. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
108. NAAG Resolution, supra note 103.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.")
112. See Bums, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America
Corp., 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 29 (2000).
113. Id. at 44.
114. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-212, -315 (2003).
115. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997).
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others do not.117 Some allow only the state Attorney General to bring
an action; 18 others allow any downstream purchaser to do so. 119
Some liberally allow class actions, 120 while others view class action cer-
tification skeptically or do not permit class actions at all.' 2' Finally,
some states have repealed Illinois Brick only as to governmental plain-
tiffs. 122 Each of these state legislative solutions to a federal law injus-
tice succeeds in addressing the problems created by Illinois Brick
without succumbing to the insurmountable complexities forecast by
the Supreme Court. Further, these alternatives offer an array of mod-
els for Congress today.
Preemption would affect more than state antitrust laws. The
paths around Illinois Brick are not limited to state antitrust law claims.
As can be seen in Judge Hogan's opinion in Mylan, explicit "repeal-
ers" of Illinois Brick are only a part of the mix of statutes and decisional
law.123 Many state antitrust remedies for downstream purchasers rest
upon judicial constructions of the state antitrust act.124 Often the state
enacted its law much earlier than the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois Brick.125 Other states rest their downstream purchaser claims
on equitable remedies like restitution and disgorgement. 126 Finally,
many claims do not even reside in antitrust. Many states recognize
price-fixing and other antitrust violations as violations of their con-
sumer protection laws or Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Acts
("Little FTC Acts").127 Preemption of these non-antitrust laws would
be particularly inappropriate and almost certainly would have broad,
unintended consequences in other areas of law.
Preemption of state law would interfere with traditional state
functions. Attorneys General bring enforcement actions on behalf of
the state in state court. Restitution is part of traditional Attorney Gen-
eral enforcement authority. States' ability to seek restitution on behalf
116. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 11-209(b) (2) (ii) (LexisNexis 2005).
117. See, e.g., W1. STAT. ANN. § 133.18 (1)(a) (West 2001).
118. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 646.775(1)(a) (2003).
119. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-161(b) (1987 & Supp. 2005).
120. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4508(c) (LexisNexis 2001).
121. See, e.g., In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 280-82 (D. Mass. 2004).
122. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-111(2) (West 2005).
123. In re Lorozepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 386-87 (D.D.C.
2002).
124. See, e.g., Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 47 P.3d 1119, 1123 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002).
125. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-60 (1993).
126. See, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 673 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
127. See, e.g., Ciardi v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 762 N.E.2d 303, 306-10 (Mass. 2002).
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of citizens injured by violations of state law should not be abridged.
Similarly, Attorneys General bring actions in state court as parens pa-
triae on behalf of the citizens of their states. Their right to do so,
which may be codified in state constitutions, may accrue by reason of
common law, or may be granted by the state legislation, should not be
preempted.
If a meaningful federal remedy for downstream purchasers is en-
acted, disputes will naturally migrate toward federal court. 128 First, by
aggregating claims in federal court, plaintiffs can achieve efficiencies
necessary for effective prosecution of claims. 129 Second, by relying on
a federal remedy, plaintiffs from all states can receive uniform recov-
eries, especially in negotiated settlements.1 30 Third, because so many
state claims are interpreted with some degree of deference to federal
law, the existence of an effective federal remedy for downstream pur-
chasers will ultimately moderate differences in state law. Finally, as a
practical matter, most antitrust class actions will end up in federal
court anyway under CAFA. Any lingering ambiguity in this regard
should be addressed by Congress when and if it provides a federal
indirect purchaser right of action. Practically speaking, a plaintiff
would need to have a very good reason indeed to rely on state law in a
multi-party, multi-district federal antitrust litigation, assuming federal
law provides an adequate remedy.131
If the federal remedy is indeed adequate, it will be used in the
large, multi-district cases, especially in light of the practical loss of the
state forum for large national class actions under CAFA. If, however,
Congress fails to adopt a federal remedy that fairly compensates con-
sumers for their losses, plaintiffs, particularly state Attorneys General
128. See, e.g., Cavil, supra note 12, at 871 (Prior to Illinois Brick, "the trend was pro-
nounced toward bringing more and more private treble damage actions to federal court
even when state antitrust or related claims were also being asserted.").
129. See Kevin O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15 ANrITRUST 34, 38
(2001).
130. See, e.g., In reBuspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Ohio
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 02-civ-01080 (D.D.C. 2002). But see In re Relafen Antitrust Li-
tig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 280-82 (D. Mass. 2004).
131. Judges in federal actions involving multiple pendent state antitrust claims have
expressed concern regarding the manageability of such litigation. In at least one such case,
the court expressly recognized that "state law claims have the potential to complicate the
jury instructions and the findings of fact that the jury will be asked to make .... " In re
Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., MDL 1030, at 2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2001) (or-
der). This concern resulted in plaintiffs, who were seeking to rely on supplemental state
antitrust claims, stipulating prior to trial that such claims "would not present additional
questions of fact for the jury, raise any additional essential elements of any claim, or involve
higher standards of proof than the federal antitrust claims." Id.
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who are entrusted with protection of consumers, will seek state reme-
dies. The Attorneys General should retain the ability to defend those
consumers against activity that illegally extracts money from them.
Plaintiffs rightly fear giving up a proven state remedy in return for a
federal remedy of questionable value.
Finally, any state's legislature may opt to eliminate its Illinois Brick
repealer. It should be left to the states to determine whether their
consumers have been accorded a reasonably meaningful federal rem-
edy for claims that consumers otherwise might pursue under state law.
Federal preemption of state remedies may make the system of anti-
trust enforcement less complex, but the resulting tidiness comes at
the price of impairing the system of federalism that is fundamental to
our national structure.
B. Procedural Recommendations
Any legislative revision of federal indirect purchaser law should
include procedural changes to make antitrust actions involving indi-
rect purchasers more efficient and less costly. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the current situation is not as dire as some would have us
think.
1. Consolidation of Related Cases: Class Action Fairness Act
CAFA132 permits aggregating the amount in controversy and sig-
nificantly relaxes diversity standards. Thus, in cases with national or
international corporate defendants, the federal courts will likely have
at least discretionary jurisdiction. In fact, CAFA has already resulted in
the removal of a significant number of state law indirect purchaser
actions from state court to federal court. 133 Once removed, these
cases have been transferred by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel
("MDL Panel") to a single court and consolidated for pretrial pur-
poses. 134 Thus, it appears that CAFA has addressed in large part the
procedural concern that defendants have been required to litigate in
multiple state and federal forums. 135
132. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
133. See, e.g., In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., MDL
1486, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (order granting motion to
dismiss); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
134. See, e.g., Dynamic Random Access Memory, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977.
135. The Class Action Fairness Act does not apply to the parens patriae actions of the
state Attorneys General. In debating Senator Pryor's amendment to S. 5, an amendment
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However, CAFA is not the entire answer. Removal under CAFA
and/or transfer/consolidation under the MDL Panel leaves two criti-
cal issues unresolved.
First, as the defendants in the DRAM and Hydrogen Peroxide cases
are discovering, mere consolidation of the direct and indirect pur-
chaser cases into a single forum does not significantly reduce the com-
plexity of their litigation.1 3 6 The parties and court are now required to
consider all federal and state claims simultaneously, in contrast with
some prior cases, where consideration of state law issues was either
avoided or stayed pending outcome of the federal action. 137 For CAFA
to provide real relief, removal and consolidation under CAFA must be
accompanied by the provision of a federal right of action for indirect
purchasers.
2. Overrule Lexecon
Second, under the Supreme Court's ruling in Lexecon,' 3 8 cases
transferred and consolidated for pretrial purposes by the MDL Panel
cannot be tried together in the transferee court.1 3 9 Under Lexecon, de-
fendants who go to trial lose much of the benefit gained with CAFA.
For the procedural benefits of CAFA to be fully realized, Congress
should overrule Lexecon and permit the transferee court to retain
transferred cases for trial.1 40
that would have explicitly excluded actions brought by the state Attorneys General on be-
half of their citizens, Senator Cornyn of Texas stated:
I think it is very plain that no power of the State attorney general is impeded by
virtue of S. 5, or will be once it is signed into law .... [C]learly, when State law
and the State Constitution specifically provide for the right of an attorney gen-
eral, a State attorney general, to sue on behalf of his State's citizens, then this bill,
when made a law, will not in any way impede that endeavor.
151 CONG. REc. S1149, S1162 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn). In addi-
tion, Senator Salazar of Colorado stated, "It is important for us to make sure as this legisla-
tion is being considered that we all understand that it is going to have no impact on the
powers and duties of the attorneys general." Id. (statement of Sen. Salazar) Nevertheless,
the beneficial parens patriae provisions of Hart-Scott-Rodino make federal court an attrac-
tive forum for multistate downstream purchaser cases and, as noted above, this is the fo-
rum the states have typically chosen in multistate cases.
136. See Dynamic Random Access Memory, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977; Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
137. See Dynamic Random Access Memory, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8977; Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
138. 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
139. Id. at 28.
140. Of course, "[d]iscretion would have to be built into any proposal to accommodate
[concerns about prejudice and the convenience of parties] to ensure that any reversal of
Lexecon is not read as a mandatory process lacking in the flexibility of prior practice." Gavil,
supra note 12, at 896.
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3. Calculation and Allocation of Damages
Assuming the above procedural recommendations are in place
and there is a single consolidated federal action involving all defend-
ants and all plaintiffs at all levels of distribution, the question remains
of how to structure the calculation and allocation of damages.
Some commentators have forcefully argued that optimal deter-
rence requires defendants to face the prospect of paying more than
treble damages. 141 Accordingly, these commentators approve of the
current damage calculation regime, where defendants in many cases
face at least the theoretical prospect of paying more than the treble
damages authorized under the Clayton Act. 142
However, any change to the federal indirect purchaser rule will
necessarily change the way antitrust damages are calculated and allo-
cated. If Congress recognizes a federal damages remedy for indirect
purchasers, federal courts will no longer be precluded from allocating
damages among direct and indirect purchasers; they will be required
to do so, at least where both groups have filed suit. Likewise, with
CAFA, indirect purchaser plaintiffs are much less likely to have their
cases (and damages) decided in state court by a judge who is only
dimly aware of the existence of a federal direct purchaser action. If
one court will in most cases be determining the amount and the allo-
cation of damages, 143  how should that court make those
determinations?
In its 2001 report, the ABA Antitrust Section's Task Force on the
Federal Antitrust Agencies suggested that lawsuits involving direct and
indirect purchasers be divided into three phases: (1) liability; (2) de-
termination of total damages; and (3) allocation of damages among
claimants. 144 Defendants would be involved in the first two phases, but
not the third. Respected commentators have recommended this ap-
proach, 145 which has the benefit of being relatively efficient for all
141. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 11, at 171-73.
142. There is no empirical support for the proposition that defendants actually do pay
more than treble damages. See, e.g., id.
143. But see Gavil, supra note 12, at 899-900 (suggesting retaining state court control
over calculation and allocation of damages in some situations).
144. The State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Report of the Task Force on the Federal Anti-
trust Agencies, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST LAw 24.
145. See generally Denger, supra note 10; see also State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals
for Reform: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission Panel II (2005) (prepared
remarks of Professor Andrew I. Gavil).
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parties and of removing defendants from damages allocation, a pro-
cess about which they may have little evidence and less interest.1 46
This proposal should not be implemented so as to entirely elimi-
nate the possibility of "double recovery." In other words, under this
proposal, it should be possible that in a particular case, calculation of
damages under a pendent state law claim, in addition to calculation of
damages under the federal claim, could result in a "phase 2" determi-
nation that defendants are required to pay more than treble dam-
ages. 147 This should be an acceptable risk for defendants, given the
significant cost reductions and efficiencies inherent in the rest of
these recommendations. Moreover, this is a necessary risk if the states'
sovereign interests are to be recognized. As discussed above, 1 4 8 states
should remain free to determine for themselves the optimal level of
antitrust deterrence necessary to protect their citizens. Furthermore,
as a practical matter, the risk of multiple damages is probably mini-
mal. A single court with all the plaintiffs, defendants, and claims in
front of it is unlikely to award extra damages under state law unless a
particular state law is very clear that it contemplates and expects such
"extra" damages. Congress could, without unreasonably imposing on
state sovereignty, require that any states intending to award extra dam-
ages must amend their statutes to affirmatively say so.
Conclusion
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court used faulty reasoning to reach
the wrong result: denial of an antitrust remedy to most ultimate con-
sumers of price-fixed goods. Indirect purchaser plaintiffs' use of state
law to recover antitrust damages in the nearly three decades since Illi-
nois Brick has demonstrated the reasonable workability of the indirect
146. This approach arguably uses the "wrong" measure of damages for direct/interme-
diate purchasers. Professor Hovenkamp has forcefully argued that the fundamental prob-
lem with both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick is that they buy into the erroneous notion that
it is necessary for courts to allocate damages among direct and indirect purchasers by de-
termining the pass-on of overcharges, when the correct measure of damages for direct and
intermediate purchasers is lost profits, with overcharge being the correct measure only for
ultimate consumers. Cost Plus, supra note 17, at 1721-25. Because the case law since Hano-
ver Shoe uses overcharges as a proxy for damages, this approach uses the same measure.
147. See Gavil, supra note 12, at 899-900 ("[A] state might well conclude that in cases of
widespread consumer injury, cumulative state and federal damages may serve important
deterrent purposes.") Of course, this would not be the case with some states, such as Texas,
which expressly provide that recoveries under federal law will be offset against recoveries
under the state antitrust statute. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §15.21 (a) (2) (Vernon
2006).
148. See supra Part III.A.3.
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purchaser remedy. Moreover, the procedural difficulties created by
the differing federal and state standards for antitrust recovery have
brought many, if not most, plaintiff and defense counsel to the same
conclusion: the system is broken and needs to be fixed.
The Antitrust Modernization Commission is in a position to rec-
ommend to Congress the necessary repairs. These recommendations
should include: (1) overruling Illinois Brick to permit recovery of anti-
trust damages by indirect purchasers, (2) retaining Hanover Shoe's limi-
tation on defensive use of pass-on as to any absent classes of plaintiffs,
(3) not preempting state antitrust and other related laws, (4) overrul-
ing Lexecon to permit consolidation of related cases for purposes of
trial, and (5) adopting a "three phase" trial in actions involving more
than one class of plaintiffs. Only with changes such as these can Con-
gress restore the proper focus of the antitrust laws to consumer
welfare.
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